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(1) The establishment of a comprehensive strategy to address the issue of non-performing loans (NPLs) is a priority for the Union. While addressing NPLs is primarily the responsibility of credit institutions and Member States, there is also a clear Union dimension to the reduction of current stocks of NPLs, as well as to the prevention of any excessive build-up of NPLs in the future. Given the interconnectedness of the banking and financial systems across the Union, where credit institutions operate in multiple jurisdictions and Member States, there is significant potential for spill-over effects between Member States and the Union at large, both in terms of economic growth and financial stability.

(2) An integrated financial system will enhance the resilience of the economic and monetary union to adverse shocks by facilitating private cross-border risk-sharing, while at the same time reducing the need for public risk-sharing. In order to achieve those objectives, the Union should complete the banking union and further develop a capital markets union (CMU). Addressing high stocks of NPLs and their possible future accumulation is essential to strengthening the banking union as it is indispensable for ensuring competition in the banking sector, preserving financial stability and encouraging lending so as to create jobs and growth within the Union.

(3) The Council conclusions of 11 July 2017 on Action Plan to Tackle Non-Performing Loans in Europe (the ‘Action Plan’) called upon various institutions to take appropriate measures to further address the high number of NPLs in the Union and prevent their possible future accumulation. The Action Plan sets out a comprehensive approach that focuses on a mix of complementary policy actions in four areas:

(i) bank supervision and regulation, (ii) reform of restructuring, insolvency and debt recovery frameworks, (iii) developing secondary markets for distressed assets, and (iv) fostering restructuring of the banking system. Action in those areas is to be taken at national level and at Union level where appropriate. The Commission announced a similar intention in its communication of 11 October 2017 on completing the banking union, which called for a comprehensive package on tackling NPLs within the Union.

(4) This Directive, together with other measures which the Commission has put forward, as well as the action taken by the European Central Bank (ECB) in the context of banking supervision under the Single Supervisory Mechanism and by the European Supervisory Authority (European Banking Authority) (EBA), established by Regulation (EU) No 1093/2010 of the European Parliament and of the Council , will create the appropriate environment for credit institutions to deal with NPLs on their balance sheets, and will reduce the risk of future NPL accumulation.

(5) When developing macro-prudential approaches to prevent the emergence of system-wide risks associated with NPLs, the European Systemic Risk Board, established by Regulation (EU) No 1092/2010 of the European Parliament and of the Council , is required to issue, where appropriate, macro-prudential warnings and recommendations relating to the secondary market for NPLs.

(6) Regulation (EU) 2019/630 of the European Parliament and of the Council introduced new rules in Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council that require credit institutions to put aside sufficient resources when new loans become non-performing, which should create appropriate incentives to address NPLs at an early stage and should prevent an excessive accumulation of them. Where loans become non-performing, more efficient enforcement mechanisms for secured loans would allow credit institutions to implement a holistic strategy to enforce NPLs, subject to strong and effective safeguards for borrowers. Nevertheless, should NPL stocks become too high, credit institutions should be able to sell them in efficient, competitive and transparent secondary markets to other operators. Competent authorities of credit institutions guide them in doing so, based on their existing bank-specific, so-called Pillar 2, powers under Regulation (EU) No 575/2013. Where NPLs become a significant and broad-based problem, Member States are able to set up national asset management companies or other alternative measures within the framework of current state aid and bank resolution rules.

(7) This Directive should enable credit institutions to better deal with loans that become non-performing by improving conditions for the sale of the credit to third parties. Moreover, when credit institutions face a large build-up of NPLs and lack the staff or expertise to properly service them, they should be able either to outsource the servicing of those loans to a specialised credit servicer or to transfer the credit agreement to a credit purchaser that has the necessary risk appetite and expertise to manage it.

(8) While the terms ‘loans’ and ‘banks’ are commonly referred to in the public debate in some Member States, the terms ‘credit’ or ‘credit agreements’ and ‘credit institution’ are used hereafter. Moreover, this Directive covers both a creditor’s rights under a non-performing credit agreement and the non-performing credit agreement itself.

(9) This Directive should foster the development of secondary markets for NPLs in the Union by removing impediments to, and laying down safeguards for, the transfer of NPLs by credit institutions to credit purchasers, while at the same time safeguarding borrowers’ rights. Any measures adopted should harmonise the authorisation requirements for credit servicers. This Directive should therefore establish a Union-wide framework for both purchasers and servicers of non-performing credit agreements issued by credit institutions, whereby credit servicers should obtain authorisation from, and be subject to the supervision of, Member States’ competent authorities.

(10) Currently, credit purchasers and credit servicers cannot reap the benefits of the internal market due to barriers erected by divergent national regimes in the absence of a dedicated and coherent regulatory and supervisory regime. At present, there are no common Union standards for the regulation of credit servicers. In particular, no common standards have been set for the regulation of debt collection. Member States have very different rules for how credit purchasers are able to acquire credit agreements from credit institutions. Credit purchasers that purchase credit issued by credit institutions are not regulated in some Member States, while in others they are subject to various requirements, sometimes amounting to a requirement to obtain an authorisation as a credit institution. Those differences between regulatory requirements have resulted in considerable obstacles to legally purchasing credit cross-border in the Union, mainly by increasing the compliance costs faced when seeking to purchase credit portfolios. As a result, credit purchasers operate in a limited number of Member States, which has resulted in weak competition in the internal market as the number of interested credit purchasers remains low. That in turn has led to an inefficient secondary market for NPLs. In addition, the essentially national markets for NPLs tend to remain of a small volume.

(11) The limited participation of credit purchasers has resulted in low demand, weak competition and low bid prices for portfolios of credit agreements on secondary markets, which is a disincentive for credit institutions to sell non-performing credit agreements. Therefore, there is a clear Union dimension to the development of markets for credits granted by credit institutions and sold to credit purchasers. On the one hand, it should be possible for credit institutions to sell non-performing credit agreements on a Union-wide scale in efficient, competitive and transparent secondary markets. On the other hand, completion of the banking union and the CMU make it necessary to act in order to prevent the accumulation of non-performing credit agreements on credit institutions’ balance sheets so that they can continue to perform their role of financing the economy. Therefore, this Directive covers credit purchasers acting in the course of their trade, business or profession when they acquire a credit agreement only where that credit agreement is a non-performing credit agreement.

(12) Non-performing credit originally granted by a credit institution might become performing in the process of servicing the credit. In that case, credit servicers should be able to continue carrying out their activities, based on their authorisation as credit servicers in accordance with this Directive.

(13) Certain Member States regulate credit servicing activities, but to varying degrees. Firstly, only some Member States regulate those activities, and, those that do, define them very differently. The increased regulatory compliance costs operate as a barrier to the development of expansion strategies by means of secondary establishment or cross-border provision of services. Secondly, a considerable number of Member States require authorisations for some of the activities that those credit servicers engage in. Those authorisations impose different requirements and do not provide for possibilities of cross-border scaling up. Again, that operates as a barrier to the provision of cross-border services. Finally, in some cases, local establishment is required by law, which hinders the exercise of the freedom to provide cross-border services.