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(5) Representative organisations of economic operators claimed that economic operators did not have sufficient information on the restrictions to free movement or crisis-response measures introduced by the Member States during the COVID-19 crisis. That was due, inter alia, to a lack of transparency from authorities of the Member States, to economic operators not knowing where to obtain such information, to language constraints and to the administrative burden implied in making repeated inquiries in all Member States, especially in a constantly changing regulatory environment. That lack of information prevented economic operators from making informed business decisions regarding the extent to which they could exercise their right to free movement or continue cross-border business operations during that crisis. It is necessary to improve the availability of information regarding national and Union-level restrictions on free movement and crisis response measures.

(6) Despite the initial lack of coordination, the internal market rules played a key role in mitigating the negative impact of the COVID-19 crisis and in ensuring a swift recovery of the Union economy, namely by precluding unjustified and disproportionate national restrictions contained in the unilateral responses by the Member States and by providing a strong incentive to find common solutions, thus promoting solidarity.

(7) Events linked to the COVID-19 crisis have highlighted the need for the Union to take a coordinated approach and be better prepared for possible future crises, especially considering the continuing effects of climate change which result in natural disasters, as well as global economic and geopolitical instabilities. Other crises which might require a quicker response to prevent barriers to free movement in the internal market and to avoid severe disruptions to supply chains that are indispensable in the maintenance of activities in the internal market include, for example, forest fires, earthquakes or large-scale cyber attacks. The fact that such crises constitute exceptional and sudden events of extraordinary nature and scale implies that such events are reasonably unexpected. As it is not known what kind of crises could arise next and have a severe impact on the internal market and its supply chains in the future, it is necessary to provide for an instrument that would apply in the event of a wide range of crises having an impact on the internal market.

(8) The impact of a crisis on the internal market can hinder the functioning of the internal market in two ways. It can give rise to obstacles to free movement or it can cause disruptions to supply chains. Disruptions to supply chains can exacerbate shortages of goods and services in the internal market and hinder production, which leads to additional barriers to trade and to the distortion of competition between Member States and between private operators, thereby disrupting the proper functioning of the internal market. Disruptions to supply chains can also lead to the emergence or likely emergence of diverging national measures to address those supply chain issues, leading to the activation of an internal market emergency mode. This Regulation should address these types of impacts on the internal market and introduce measures to avoid obstacles to free movement or supply chain disruptions that create shortages of crisis-relevant goods or services.

(9) In order to avoid an unnecessary administrative burden on Member States, incidents reported by means of the ad hoc alerts for early warning referred to in this Regulation should be defined in such a manner that they exclude events that have a negligible foreseeable consequence on the free movement of goods, services and persons, including workers, or on the supply chains of goods and services that are indispensable to the maintenance of vital societal functions or economic activities in the internal market.

(10) In order to ensure that the framework of measures laid down by this Regulation is able to deploy its full effect in the context of the internal market vigilance and the internal market emergency modes, the Commission should be empowered to set out detailed arrangements regarding crisis preparedness, cooperation, exchange of information and crisis communication. Those detailed arrangements, taking the form of a contingency framework, should set out the specific technical and operational aspects of the mechanisms for exchanging information between the Commission and the Member States. Furthermore, it should lay down arrangements for operational coordination between the Commission and the Member States regarding crisis communication. In this context, a dedicated inventory of all the competent authorities of the respective Member States involved in the implementation of the framework laid down by this Regulation should be set up on the basis of the information communicated by the Member States. That inventory should indicate, in particular, the roles and responsibilities assigned to the competent authorities of their respective Member States during the internal market vigilance and emergency modes in accordance with national law. The arrangements between the Commission and the Member States should also cover the secure exchange of information concerning consultation of the economic operators and social partners with respect to their respective initiatives and actions to mitigate and respond to the effects of a potential crisis.

(11) The measures set out in this Regulation should be deployed in a coherent, transparent, efficient, proportionate and timely manner, having due regard to the need to maintain vital societal functions, including public security, public safety, public order or public health. This Regulation should not affect the competence of the Member States with respect to, for example, national policies of public health and should be without prejudice to the responsibility of the Member States to safeguard national security and their power to safeguard other essential state functions, including ensuring the territorial integrity of the state and maintaining law and order. This Regulation should therefore be without prejudice to matters related to national security and defence.

(12) This Regulation provides the necessary means to ensure, during times of crisis, the continued functioning of the internal market, of the businesses that operate in the internal market and its strategic supply chains, including the free movement of goods, services and persons, including workers, and the availability of crisis-relevant goods or services to citizens, businesses and public authorities. In addition, this Regulation establishes a forum for appropriate coordination, cooperation and exchange of information. Furthermore, it provides the means for the timely accessibility and availability of the information needed for a targeted response and adequate market behaviour by businesses and citizens during a crisis.

(13) Where possible, this Regulation should allow for anticipation of events and crises by allowing the Union to continue building on ongoing analysis concerning critically important sectors of the internal market economy.

(14) By reinforcing the resilience and preparedness of Union industry with regard to critical raw materials, Regulation (EU) 2024/1252 of the European Parliament and of the Council complements this Regulation, which allows the Commission, during an internal market vigilance mode or internal market emergency mode, to activate targeted measures when a threat to or a disruption to the supply of goods of critical importance emerges, including with regard to critical raw materials.

(15) This Regulation should not duplicate the existing framework for medicinal products, medical devices or other medical countermeasures under the EU Health Security Framework, including Regulations (EU) 2022/123 , (EU) 2022/2370 and (EU) 2022/2371 of the European Parliament and of the Council and Council Regulation (EU) 2022/2372 regarding crisis preparedness and response in the area of health. The EU Health Security Framework should take precedence over this Regulation as regards supply chain disruptions and shortages of medicinal products, medical devices or other medical countermeasures where the conditions of that framework are met. Therefore, medicinal products, medical devices or other medical countermeasures within the meaning of Regulations (EU) 2022/2371 and (EU) 2022/2372 should, where they have been included in the list adopted pursuant to Article 7(1) of Regulation (EU) 2022/2372, be excluded from the scope of this Regulation, except in relation to the provisions relating to the free movement of goods, services and persons, including workers, during an internal market emergency, and in particular those designed to re-establish and facilitate free movement.