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Amendments to Regulation (EU) 2017/1938 Regulation (EU) 2017/1938 is amended as follows:

(1) Article 1 is replaced by the following: ‘Article 1 Subject matter This Regulation establishes provisions aiming to safeguard the security of gas supply in the Union by ensuring the proper and continuous functioning of the internal market for gas by allowing for exceptional measures to be implemented when the market can no longer deliver the gas supplies required, including solidarity measure of a last resort, and by providing for the clear definition and attribution of responsibilities among natural gas undertakings, the Member States and the Union regarding both preventive action and the reaction to concrete disruptions of gas supply. This Regulation also establishes transparent mechanisms concerning, in a spirit of solidarity, the coordination of planning for, and response to, emergencies at national, regional and Union level.’ ;

(2) Article 2 is amended as follows:

(a) point (1) is deleted;

(b) the following point is added: ‘(32) “gas” means natural gas as defined in Article 2, point (1), of Directive (EU) 2024/1788. Directive (EU) 2024/1788 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 June 2024 on common rules for the internal markets in renewable gas, natural gas and hydrogen, amending Directive (EU) 2023/1791 and repealing Directive 2009/73/EC ().’;"

(3) Article 7 is amended as follows:

(a) paragraph 1 is replaced by the following: ‘1. By 1 November 2026, ENTSOG shall carry out a Union-wide simulation of gas supply and infrastructure disruption scenarios, including scenarios of a prolonged disruption of a single supply source. The simulation shall include the identification and assessment of emergency gas supply corridors and shall also identify which Member States can address identified risks, including in relation to gas storage and LNG as well as scenarios examining the impact of a decrease in gas demand through energy savings or energy efficiency measures. The gas supply and infrastructure disruption scenarios and the methodology for the simulation shall be defined by ENTSOG in cooperation with the GCG. ENTSOG shall ensure an appropriate level of transparency and access to the modelling assumptions used in its scenarios. The Union-wide simulation of gas supply and infrastructure disruption scenarios shall be repeated every four years until circumstances warrant more frequent updates.’ ;

(b) in paragraph 4, point (e) is replaced by the following: ‘(e) taking into account risks relating to the control of infrastructure relevant to the security of gas supply to the extent that they may involve, inter alia, risks of underinvestment, undermining diversification, misuse of existing infrastructure, including hoarding of storage capacities, or an infringement of Union law;’ ;

(4) Article 8 is amended as follows:

(a) paragraph 1 is deleted;

(b) in paragraph 3, the third subparagraph is replaced by the following: ‘The regional chapters shall contain appropriate and effective cross-border measures, including in relation to gas storage and LNG, subject to agreement between the Member States implementing the measures from the same or different risk groups affected by the measure on the basis of the simulation referred to in Article 7(1) and the common risk assessment.’ ;

(5) the following article is inserted: ‘Article 8a Measures on cybersecurity 1. When establishing the preventive action plans and the emergency plans, the Member States shall consider the appropriate measures related to cybersecurity 2. The Commission is empowered to adopt delegated acts in accordance with Article 19 to supplement this Regulation by establishing gas sector-specific rules for the cybersecurity aspects of cross-border gas flows, including rules on common minimum requirements, planning, monitoring, reporting and crisis management

3. For the purpose of drafting the delegated acts referred to in paragraph 2 of this Article, the Commission shall work closely with the Agency, the European Union Agency for Cybersecurity (ENISA), ENTSOG and a limited number of main stakeholders concerned, as well as entities with existing competences in cybersecurity, within their own mandate, such as Security Operation Centres (SOCs) relevant for regulated entities, and computer security incident response teams (CSIRTs), as referred to in Article 10 of Directive (EU) 2022/2555 of the European Parliament and of the Council. Directive (EU) 2022/2555 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 December 2022 on measures for a high common level of cybersecurity across the Union, amending Regulation (EU) No 910/2014 and Directive (EU) 2018/1972, and repealing Directive (EU) 2016/1148 (NIS 2 Directive)().’;"

(6) Article 9, paragraph 1 is amended as follows:

(a) point (e) is replaced by the following: ‘(e) other preventive measures designed to address the risks identified in the risk assessment such as those relating to the need to enhance interconnections between neighbouring Member States, to further improve energy efficiency, to prevent capacity hoarding, to reduce gas demand and the possibility to diversify gas routes and sources of gas supply and the regional utilisation of existing storage and LNG capacities, if appropriate, in order to maintain gas supply to all customers as far as possible;’ ;

(b) the following point is added: ‘(l) information on measures related to cybersecurity, as referred to in Article 8a.’ ;

(7) in Article 11, the following paragraph is inserted: ‘7a. By way of derogation from Article 6(1), (2) and (3), Article 6b(1), third subparagraph, point (a), Article 6c(2), second subparagraph, point (b), and Article 10(1), point (l), Member States may, exceptionally, decide to take temporary measures to reduce the non-essential gas consumption of protected customers, in particular when one of the crisis levels pursuant to paragraph 1 of this Article or a regional or Union emergency pursuant to Article 12 is declared. Such temporary measures shall be limited to non-essential gas consumption and shall take into account the following elements:

(a) the impact of a disruption on supply chains that are critical for society;

(b) the possible negative impacts in other Member States, in particular on supply chains of downstream sectors that are critical for society;

(c) the potential long-lasting damage to industrial installations;

(d) the possibilities for reducing consumption and substituting products in the Union. Such exceptional measures may be taken only after an assessment is carried out by the competent authorities with regard to the conditions to determine such non-essential volumes of gas. As a result of measures referred to in the first subparagraph of this paragraph, the reduction of non-essential gas consumption of vulnerable customers, as defined by Member States in accordance with Article 26 of Directive (EU) 2024/1788, shall be avoided.’ ;

(8) in Article 12(6), the second subparagraph is replaced by the following: ‘Within three days of notification of the Commission request, the Member State or the competent authority shall modify its action and notify the Commission thereof, or shall inform the Commission of the reasons for which it disagrees with the request. In the latter case, the Commission may, within three days of being informed, amend or withdraw its request or convene the Member State or the competent authority and, where the Commission considers it to be necessary, the GCG in order to consider the issue. The Commission shall set out its detailed reasons for requesting any modification to the action. The Member State or the competent authority shall modify its action or take action in order to ensure compliance with paragraph 5 as far as technically and safely possible for the integrity of the gas system. The Member State or the competent authority shall inform the Commission of the measures adopted.’ ;

(9) Article 13 is amended as follows:

(a) paragraphs 3, 4 and 5 are replaced by the following: ‘3. A solidarity measure shall be taken as a last resort and shall apply provided that the requesting Member State has:

(a) declared an emergency under Article 11;

(b) not been able to cover the deficit in gas supply to its solidarity protected customers despite the application of the measure referred to in Article 11(3) or, where a Member State has taken temporary measures to reduce the non-essential gas consumption of protected customers in accordance with Article 11(7a), the essential volumes of gas consumption to its solidarity protected customers;

(c) exhausted all market-based measures (voluntary measures), all non-market-based measures (mandatory measures) and other measures contained in its emergency plan;

(d) notified an explicit request to the Commission and to the competent authorities of all Member States with which it is connected either directly or pursuant to paragraph 2 via a third country, accompanied by a description of the implemented measures referred to in point (c) of this paragraph

3a. The Member States which are obliged to provide solidarity pursuant to paragraph 1 shall be entitled to deduct from the solidarity offer the supplies to its solidarity protected customers or, where a Member State has taken temporary measures to reduce the non-essential gas consumption of protected customers in accordance with Article 11(7a), the supplies of the essential volumes of consumption of gas to its solidarity protected customers 4. The Member States that receive a request for a solidarity measure shall make offers on the basis of voluntary demand-side measures as much as and for as long as possible, before resorting to non-market-based measures. Where market-based measures prove to be insufficient for the Member State providing solidarity to cover the deficit in gas supply to solidarity protected customers in the requesting Member State, the Member State providing solidarity may introduce non-market-based measures in order to comply with the obligations laid down in paragraphs 1 and 2