FantasticSearch

(40) The Reform Agendas should be results-based and include indicators for assessing progress towards the achievement of general and specific objectives of the Facility set out in this Regulation. Those indicators should be based on internationally agreed indicators. Indicators should also, to the extent possible, be coherent with the key performance indicators included in the IPA III Results Framework, in the EFSD+ Results Measurement Framework and in the WBIF. The indicators should be relevant, accepted, credible, easy, and robust.

(41) Funds under the Facility should not support activities or measures which undermine peace agreements in the region.

(42) The Commission should assess each Reform Agenda based on the list of criteria set out in this Regulation. In order to ensure uniform conditions for the implementation of this Regulation, implementing powers should be conferred on the Commission to approve those Reform Agendas. Those powers should be exercised in accordance with Regulation (EU) No 182/2011 of the European Parliament and of the Council . The Commission will duly take into account Council decision 2010/427/EU and the role of the European External Action Service (EEAS), where appropriate, and in particular when monitoring the fulfilment of the relevant precondition for Union support.

(43) The Commission implementing decision referred to in this Regulation should at the same time constitute a work programme within the meaning of Article 110(2) of the Financial Regulation in respect of the amount of non-repayable financial support under this Regulation.

(51) Considering that the financial risks associated with the support to the beneficiaries in the form of loans under the Facility is comparable to the financial risks associated with lending operations under Regulation (EU) 2021/947, provisioning for the financial liability from loans under this Regulation should be constituted at the rate of 9 %, in line with Article 211 of the Financial Regulation and the funding of the provisioning should be sourced from EUR 2 billion envelope under the Facility.

(52) In order to ensure that the provisioning rate remains adequate to the financial risks and to display the progress of the implementation of the Facility the power to adopt acts in accordance with Article 290 TFEU should be delegated to the Commission in respect of amending the provisioning rate and of defining the detailed elements of the Scoreboard. It is of particular importance that the Commission carry out appropriate consultations during its preparatory work, including at expert level, and that those consultations be conducted in accordance with the principles laid down in the Interinstitutional Agreement of 13 April 2016 on Better Law-Making . In particular, to ensure equal participation in the preparation of delegated acts, the European Parliament and the Council receive all documents at the same time as Member States’ experts, and their experts systematically have access to meetings of Commission expert groups dealing with the preparation of delegated acts.

(53) In order to maximise the leverage of Union financial support to attract additional investment, and to ensure Union control over the expenditure, the infrastructure investments supporting the Reform Agendas should be implemented through the WBIF. Individual projects or programmes should be submitted to the WBIF Operational Board for its opinion only upon completion of the relevant payment conditions set out in the Reform Agendas. In the case of non-fulfilment of relevant payment conditions for investments within one year, the Commission should be able to redistribute the investment funding under the WBIF among the other beneficiaries.

(54) In order to ensure that the beneficiaries dispose of start-up funding for the implementation of the first reforms, each beneficiary should have access to up to 7 % of the total amount provided for in this Facility as financial assistance in the form of a pre-financing, subject to availability of funding and to the respect of the preconditions for support under the Facility.

(55) It is important to guarantee both flexibility and programmability in providing Union support to the beneficiaries. For that purpose, funds under the Facility should be released according to a fixed semi-annual schedule, subject to availability of funding, on the basis of a request for the release of funds submitted by the beneficiaries and following verification by the Commission of the satisfactory fulfilment of both the general conditions related to macro-financial stability, sound public financial management, transparency and oversight of the budget and the relevant payment conditions. Where a payment condition is not fulfilled as per the indicative timeline set in the decision approving the Reform Agenda, the Commission could withhold in whole or in part the disbursement of funds corresponding to that condition, following a methodology on partial payments. The disbursement of the corresponding withheld funds could take place during the next window for the release of funds and up to twelve months after the original deadline set out in the indicative timeline, provided that the payment conditions have been fulfilled. In the first year of implementation, that deadline should be extended to 24 months from the initial negative assessment.

(56) By way of derogation from Article 116(2) and (5) of the Financial Regulation, it is appropriate to set the payment deadline for contributions to state budgets starting from the date of the communication of the decision authorising the disbursement to the beneficiary and to exclude the payment of default interest by the Commission to the beneficiary.

(57) The Commission should provide, upon request of the European Parliament in the framework of the discharge procedure, detailed information about the implementation of the Union budget under the Facility, in particular as regards audits carried out, including weaknesses identified and corrective measures taken, and as regards the award of contracts for investments under the WBIF, including where applicable the amount of beneficiaries’ co-financing as well as other sources of contributions including from other Union financing instruments.

(58) In the framework of the Union’s restrictive measures, adopted on the basis of Article 29 TEU and Article 215 TFEU, no funds or economic resources may be made available, directly or indirectly, to or for the benefit of designated legal persons, entities or bodies. Such designated entities, and entities owned or controlled by them, therefore should not be supported by the Facility.

(59) In accordance with the Financial Regulation, Regulation (EU, Euratom) 883/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council and Council Regulations (EC, Euratom) No 2988/95 , (Euratom, EC) No 2185/96 and (EU) 2017/1939 , the financial interests of the Union are to be protected by means of proportionate measures, including measures relating to the prevention, detection, correction and investigation of irregularities, fraud, corruption, conflicts of interest, double funding, to the recovery of funds lost, wrongly paid or incorrectly used.

(60) In particular, in accordance with regulations (Euratom, EC) No 2185/96 and (EU, Euratom) 883/2013, the European Anti-Fraud Office (OLAF) should be in a position to carry out administrative investigations, including on-the-spot checks and inspections, with a view to establishing whether there has been fraud, corruption or any other illegal activity affecting the financial interests of the Union.

(61) In accordance with Article 129 of the Financial Regulation, the necessary rights and access should be granted to the Commission, OLAF, the Court of Auditors and, where applicable the European Public Prosecutor’s Office (EPPO), including by third parties involved in the implementation of Union funds.

(62) The Commission should ensure that the financial interests of the Union are effectively protected under the Facility. Considering the long track record of financial assistance provided to the beneficiaries also under indirect management and taking into account their gradual alignment with the Unions internal control standards and practices, the Commission should rely to a great extent on the operation of the beneficiaries’ internal control and fraud prevention systems. In particular, the Commission and OLAF and, where applicable, EPPO should be informed of all suspected cases of irregularities, fraud, corruption and conflicts of interest affecting the implementation of funds under the Facility without delay.

(63) Furthermore, the beneficiaries should report the irregularities including fraud which have been the subject of a primary administrative or judicial finding, without delay, to the Commission and keep it informed of the progress of administrative and legal proceedings. With the objective of alignment to good practices in Member States, this reporting should be done by electronic means, using the Irregularity Management System, established by the Commission.